报告题目：Fair Allocations of Indivisible Chores with Subsidy

报告时间：2024年6月26日（星期三）上午9：00-10：00

报告地点：87978797威尼斯老品牌中心校区王湘浩楼A521

报 告 人：Xiaowei Wu

报告人简介：

Dr. Xiaowei Wu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer and Information Science with the State Key Laboratory of Internet of Things for Smart City (IOTSC) at University of Macau (UM). He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Hong Kong (HKU) and his B.Eng. degree from University of Science and Technology of China (USTC). His research interests span various topics in online approximation algorithms, algorithmic game theory and data mining. He has published more than 50 papers in top theory or artificial intelligence conferences and journals including JACM, SICOMP, AIJ, STOC, FOCS, SODA, EC, WINE, AAAI and IJCAI.

报告内容简介：

In this talk we will introduce some of our recent developments for the computation and approximation of fair allocation problem for indivisible chores, which is within the centre of computational social choice and algorithmic game theory. In this problem we need to allocate a set of indivisible chores to a group of heterogenous agents in a fair way. We will introduce the popular fairness notions for this problem, including Envy-freeness (EF), Proportionality (Prop), Maximin Share (MMS), and their relaxations. In this talk, we will survey the recent results on the existence, computation, approximation, and efficiency of these fairness notions, under different settings. This talk will focus more on the setting when the allocator is allowed to subsidize the agents to eliminate the inevitable unfairness for indivisible chores. This talk is based on our recent publications on IJCAI 2022, WWW 2022, WINE 2023, ICML 2023, EC 2023 and AIJ 2024.

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